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A. Federalizing State Law
Title 28, section 1331(a) of the United States Code (Code) grants to
federal district courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States where the
matter in controversy exceeds $10,000.1 Although the federal courts have
applied the $10,000 requirement with relative ease,2 those courts have
had difficulty determining whether a case "arises under" federal law.3
77 See note 2 supra. Part of the judicial encouragement of private antitrust actions
stems from the monetary benefit that private actions provide to taxpayers. See Loevinger,
supra note 2, at 168. Unlike antitrust actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission or
the U.S. Department of Justice, private actions do not require the expenditure of public
funds for investigation and litigation counsel. Id. Additionally, damages awarded in private
actions often substantially surpass fines that would be levied in criminal actions, thus mak-
ing potential sanctions in private actions far more serious. Id. at 169.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976); see U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. I.
Article III of the Constitution extends federal judicial power to cases arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. U.S. CONsT. art. 3, § 2, cl. I. Article III
also vests judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may
ordain and establish. Id. art. 3, § 1. Congress exercised its power to establish lower federal
courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The Judiciary
Act, however, limited the courts' jurisdiction to cases arising under federal law. Id. § 9.
Federal court jurisdiction was granted only over cases involving suits for penalties and for-
feitures incurred under federal laws and in cases where an alien sued in tort for a violation
of the law of nations. Id.; see HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM, 845 (2d ed. 1973).
Congress, however, did not extend lower federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States until the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1875.
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1976)); see London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare And A Delusion, 57 MICH.
L. REv. 835, 836 (1959).
2 See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (Each member of a
plaintiff class in a class action filed under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) must meet the $10,000
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976)).
3 Professor Wright has noted that, despite the tremendous amount of attention given to
the area of federal question jurisdiction by legal scholars, there is no clear test which has yet
been developed to determine when a case "arises under" the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, § 17 at 64 (3rd ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
The Supreme Court has struggled with the meaning of Article II's "arises under" re-
quirement. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the
Court held that a case arises under federal law when a federal question forms an ingredient
of the original cause. Id. at 823. The Osborn test, however, was overly broad because, in
almost every case, some argument can be made that a federal question is involved. See
WRIGHT, supra, at 65. The Osborn test was therefore abandoned, and federal courts have
continued to struggle to develop a workable test for determining the existence of federal
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federal courts ordinarily cannot entertain jurisdiction under section
1331(a) when a claim is founded upon state law.4 State law, however, may
serve as federal law for section 1331(a) jurisdictional purposes in certain
circumstances. 5
The Supreme Court has held that the federal government may obtain
exclusive jurisdiction over land ceded to it by a state.' Federal law should
govern claims arising on land ceded to the federal government over which
the United States has exclusive jurisdiction.7 Where a cause of action
arises on land over which the United States has obtained exclusive
jurisdiction and no applicable federal law exists, a federal court may
adopt state law as federal law' to insure that there will be no area left
question jurisdiction. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (case "arises
under" the Constitution or laws of the United States when right or immunity created by the
Constitution or laws of the United States is an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of
action); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That A Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 892 (1967).
See Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926); notes 1 & 3 supra.
' See Macomber v. Bose, 401 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1968); Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d
123, 124 (5th Cir. 1952); note 40 infra.
6 The United States may obtain exclusive jurisdiction over an area by two methods.
The United States may purchase land with the consent of the state legislature for military
and defense needs. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The United States may also acquire land
by cession from the states. See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940). In
both instances the Supreme Court has held that the state is entitled to reserve jurisdiction
consistent with the United States' use of the property for the purpose for which it is ac-
quired. James v. Dravo Contr. Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937). The United States may obtain
exclusive jurisdiction over certain claims arising from an area without obtaining exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims arising from that area. Buttery v. Robbins, 177 Va. 368, 379, 14
S.E.2d 544, 548 (1941). Many states, on ceding jurisdiction over land to the federal govern-
ment, reserve the authority to serve civil and criminal process to prevent the area from
becoming a sanctuary for fugitives wanted by the state. Such a reservation is not inconsis-
tent with federal exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the area. United States v. Lovely,
319 F.2d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 1963); see REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. FOR THE
STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, pt. II, at 10 (1957) [herein-
after cited as COMMITTEE REPORT]; note 34 infra.
I Under conflict of laws principles, the law of the place where an alleged wrong was
inflicted governs the rights of the parties. Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F.2d 556, 558
(3rd Cir. 1943); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 175 (1971).
1 State law may be adopted by a federal court as a matter of common or statutory law.
The common law principle of adopting state law as it existed at the time the United States
acquired exclusive jurisdiction is borrowed from the field of international law. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885); see James Stewart & Co. v.
Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940). Later changes in the laws of the state do not affect
the law of the area under federal jurisdiction. See Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439,
449-54 (1929).
Congress has stated that certain state laws may be adopted by the federal courts or
applied by the states for areas under the United States' exclusive jurisdiction. These include
state wrongful death laws, 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1976); state fish and game laws, 10 U.S.C. § 2671
(1976); and state workmen's compensation laws, 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1976). See Sewell, The
Federal Enclave, 33 TENN. L. REV. 283, 306-07 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Sewell]. The
Assimilative Crimes Act explicitly adopts state law as federal law to preserve federal juris-
diction. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976); see Robinson Protective Alarm Co. v. City of Philadelphia,
581 F.2d 371, 375 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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without a legal system for the protection of private rights.9 In a recent
decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff's cause ,of action did
not arise in an area under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
and therefore refused to adopt state law as federal law for jurisdictional
purposes.
In Pratt v. Kelly, 0 the federal district court for the Western District
of Virginia considered a wrongful death claim stemming from an
automobile accident on the Blue Ridge Parkway."' The United States
acquired the land that became the Blue Ridge Parkway by deed from
Virginia. In the deed, Virginia ceded ownership of the land but reserved
jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters.12 At time of suit, the
Parkway was owned and operated by the United States.13 The plaintiff in
Pratt contended that since the Parkway in Virginia was owned and
operated by the United States, the district court should entertain
jurisdiction under section 1331(a). The plaintiff further argued that since
there is no federal wrongful death statute, the Virginia wrongful death
statute should serve as federal law. The district court disagreed with the
plaintiff and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction."4
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that since the Parkway was owned
by the United States, the grant of administrative control over the
Parkway to the federal government contained in title 16, section 460a-2 of
the Code should be construed so as to give the United States exclusive
jurisdiction over the Parkway. 5 The plaintiff further argued that since
section 460a-2 gives the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the
9 See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940).
10 585 F.2d 692, (4th Cir. 1978).
11 Id. at 694 (discussing the district court's unpublished opinion). The plaintiff in Pratt,
decedent's father and administrator, brought suit under the Virginia wrongful death statute,
VA. CODE §§ 8.01-50-63 (1977), against the driver of the decedents car as well as another
driver. The plaintiff alleged that both cars involved in the accident were being driven at an
excessive rate of speed and in a negligent manner. 585 F.2d at 694.
12 Id. at 96-99. In the deed conveying the land which became the Blue Ridge Parkway,
Virginia ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States only to regulate traffic on the
highway, protect the land, and operate and administer the parkway. 1936 Virginia Acts, ch.
3, § 4. Virginia later prospectively ceded to the federal government concurrent governmen-
tal, judicial, executive and legislative power and jurisdiction over lands acquired by the
United States. VA. CODE § 7.1-18.1 (Replacement Volume 1979). For crimes committed on
lands "acquired" in any manner by the United States, the practice is to permit, if not re-
quire the federal government to prosecute. Virginia has adopted a "hands off" policy.
United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Va. 1963); see note 34 infra.
13 The federal government has been granted statutory authority to administer and op-
erate the Blue Ridge Parkway. 16 U.S.C. § 460a-2 (1976); see notes 15 & 19 infra.
14 595 F.2d at 694.
18 Id. 16 U.S.C. § 460a-2 (1976) states in pertinent part:
All lands and easements heretofore or hereafter conveyed to the United
States by the States of Virginia and North Carolina for the right-of-way for the
projected parkway ... shall be known as the Blue Ridge Parkway and shall be
administered and maintained by the Secretary of the Interior through the Na-
tional Park Service.
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Parkway, title 16, section 457 of the Code, which adopts the surrounding
state's wrongful death statute as federal law for actions arising on areas
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, 6 should be
read to federalize Virginia's wrongful death statute.
17
The defendants in Pratt contended that section 460a-2 was not
intended to confer exlcusive jurisdiction upon the United States over the
Parkway."8 Instead, the defendants argued that section 460a-2 merely
grants to the federal government the power to administer and maintain
16 585 F.2d at 694. 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1976) states:
In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act of an-
other within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, within the exterior boundaries of any State, such right of action
shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within
whose exterior boundaries such place may be; and in any action brought to recover
on account of injuries sustained in any such place the rights of the parties shall be
governed by the laws of the State within the exterior boundaries of which it may
be.
Section 457, by its own terms, expressly applies only to areas under the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States. During Senate debate of the bill which later became § 457, the
sponsors explained that the bill was meant to fill the legal void left in areas where the
United States had obtained exclusive jurisdiction. 58 CONG. REc. 2052 (1919). By allowing
federal courts to use state law, dependents of a decedent killed in an area under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States may recover against the persons answerable for his
death. Id.
In Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315 (1934), the Supreme Court held that § 457
authorized federal suits under certain state survival statutes. Id. at 319. Section 457, how-
ever, only applies to areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 16 U.S.C. §
457 (1976); see The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 609 n.9 (1958) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
" 585 F.2d at 694; see note 8 supra. Plaintiff relied on Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959), to support his contention that § 457 should be
read to federalize Virginia's wrongful death statute. Stokes involved a suit between two Vir-
ginia citizens arising from injuries sustained in an auto collision on a military reservation in
Kansas. The Fourth Circuit, reversing the district court's dismissal of the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, held that § 457 was an adequate basis for jurisdiction since the
area involved was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 665-66.
The plaintiff also relied on Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952). Mater in-
volved a negligence action for injuries sustained on a federal military fort in Georgia under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. Georgia had ceded the land to the
United States but retained concurrent jurisdiction only for the service of state process and
the regulation of public utilities thereon. The Fifth Circuit held that the concurrent state
jurisdiction had no effect on the federal jurisdiction. Id. at 125. Therefore, the court held
that the claim arose under the laws of the United States, giving the district court jurisdic-
tion under § 1331(a). Id.; see note 6 supra.
Plaintiff also cited Olsen v. McPartlin, 105 F. Supp. 561 (D. Minn. 1952), a case which
involved facts resembling those of the Pratt case. The plaintiff in Olsen brought a negli-
gence claim for injuries received in an auto accident on a United States military reservation
in Minnesota. Minnesota had ceded jurisdiction over the reservation but reserved concur-
rent jurisdiction to serve state civil and criminal process. The Olsen court held that Minne-
sota law applied as federal law and therefore the action arose under the laws of the United
States for federal question jurisdiction purposes. Id. at 563.
18 585 F.2d at 694; see note 19 infra.
[Vol. XXXVII
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
the parkway. 9 As further support for the contention that the United
States had not obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the Parkway, the
defendants asserted that Virginia had reserved jurisdiction over all civil
matters arising on the Parkway in its conveying deed to the United
States.2" The defendants therefore contended that the Fourth Circuit
should not federalize Virginia's wrongful death statute since section 457
only applies where the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over an
area.
2 1
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the defendants and affirmed the
district court's dismissal.2 2 After summarily dismissing the plaintiff's
claim that section 460a-2 gives the United States exclusive jurisdiction
over the area," the Pratt court held that a land transfer from a state to
the United States does not necessarily imply that the United States
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over that area.24 In accepting the
defendants' argument, the court took judicial notice of Virginia's
reservation of jurisdiction in the conveying deed and the corresponding
acts of the Virginia legislature.2 5 In light of this reservation, and the
dismissal of section 460a-2 as a possible basis for exclusive federal
jurisdiction,'26 the Pratt court held that the federal government did not
acquire exclusive jurisdiction over the Parkway and thus could not
maintain jurisdiction under either section 1331(a) or section 45727
Federal courts federalize state law to insure that no area will be left
without a developed legal system for the protection of private rights. 8
19 585 F.2d at 694. During House debate on § 460a-2, Representative Doughton, one of
the sponsors who introduced the bill, explained that the purpose of the bill was simply to
give the Interior Department maintenance power over the Parkway. 80 CONG. REc. 10584
(1936); see note 15 supra.
20 585 F.2d at 696; see text accompanying note 12 supra.
11 585 F.2d at 694; see note 35 infra.
11 585 F.2d at 697.
" The Pratt court stated that § 460a-2 merely establishes the Blue Ridge Parkway and
provides for its administration. The court concluded that § 460a-2 does not confer exclusive
jurisdiction upon the United States. 585 F.2d at 694 n.2; see note 19 supra.
2" 585 F.2d at 695. 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1976) states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtaining of exclusive juris-
diction in the United States over lands or interests therein which have been or
shall hereafter be acquired by it shall not be required . . . unless and until the
United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired...
[by filing notice with the governor of the state] . . . it shall be conclusively pre-
sumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted.
The Fourth Circuit has held, consistent with other circuits, that § 255 applies only to
land acquired by the United States after 1940. Markham v. United States, 215 F.2d 56, 58
(4th Cir. 1954); see, e.g., United States v. Redstone, 488 F.2d 300, 302 (8th Cir. 1973). The
Supreme Court has clearly established that a state may limit a cession of jurisdiction to the
federal government. James v. Dravo Contr. Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937); see note 6 supra;
note 34 infra.
15 585 F.2d at 696-97; see text accompanying note 12 supra.
28 See note 23 supra.
27 585 F.2d at 697.
28 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940).
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Such a legal vacuum may occur in cases where the United States has
exclusive jurisdiction over an area.29 In Pratt, the plaintiff's claim to
federal jurisdiction depended upon establishing that the United States
had exclusive jurisdiction over the Parkway. Although the Parkway is
owned and administered by the federal government under section 460a-
2,30 the only reference to jurisdiction in that section merely provides for
the maximum parkway right of way to be increased, if necessary. 1 In
addition, the legislative history of section 460a-2 clearly indicates that
section 460a-2 was intended only to provide for administration and
maintenance of the Parkway, and not to give the United States exclusive
jurisdiction over that area.3 2 Therefore, the Pratt court's refusal to
interpret section 460a-2 as granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
government was correct.
The Fourth Circuit relied primarily on Virginia's reservation of civil
jurisdiction in the conveying deed to hold that the United States did not
have exclusive jurisdiction over the Parkway.33 Although the Fourth
Circuit did not set forth the reasoning behind this conclusion, a state's
reservation of jurisdiction over civil claims arising from an area
necessarily negates the exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction over that
area.' The reservation by Virginia of civil jurisdiction coupled with the
fact that section 460a-2 provides only for administration and
maintenance of the Parkway compels this conclusion that the Parkway is
not under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Section 457 is
therefore clearly inapplicable to the facts of Pratt."
The decision in Pratt is consistent with prior Fourth Circuit cases
dealing with the adoption of state law for'section 1331(a) jurisdictional
purposes.36 A good method of handling other claims arising from areas
29 See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
30 16 U.S.C. § 460a-2 (1976); see note 15 supra.
"1 16 U.S.C. § 460a-2 (1976); see note 15 supra.
3' See note 19 supra.
33 595 F.2d at 696-97; see note 23 supra; text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
3' A state's reservation of authority to serve civil and criminal process insures that the
ceded area does not become a haven for fugitives. See note 6 supra. Thus, the state's desire
to maintain minimal jurisdictional control does not conflict with the federal government's
exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the same area. See James v. Dravo Contr. Co., 302
U.S. 134, 148 (1937). Nevertheless, when the state and federal governments hold concurrent
jurisdiction over an area, neither can successfully maintain that exclusive jurisdiction exists.
Further, when a state reserves all jurisdictional control over a ceded area, no federal exclu-
sive jurisdiction exists.
Although Virginia reserved adjudicative control over all criminal matters arising on the
Parkway, federal courts regularly entertain these suits. See note 12 supra. Nevertheless,
federal exercise of criminal jurisdiction is not inconsistent with Virginia's reservation of ju-
risdiction over criminal matters because Virginia has adopted a "hands off" policy regarding
criminal matters. See note 12 supra.
See note 16 supra; note 36 infra.
See e.g., Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 665 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816
(1959); note 17 supra.
The Fourth Circuit relied on Board of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556
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under exclusive federal jurisdiction which are not covered by federal law
might be for the United States to surrender a portion of its exclusive
jurisdiction to the states.37 By giving the states sufficient jurisdiction to
resolve claims arising on federally owned land, the federal government
could insure that all areas would have a developed legal system" and
thereby eliminate the unusual problems related to federalizing state law.
MARK A. WILLIAMS
(E.D. Va. 1976), in affirming its dismissal of Pratt's claim. 585 F.2d at 695. The district
court in Supervisors stated that where a state retains jurisdiction over civil and criminal
matters, aggrieved citizens have the state forum for redress of their grievances. 408 F. Supp.
at 564. Therefore, Supervisors held that where a state forum is available, the rationale be-
hind federalizing state law is no longer compelling. Id. See also Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d
123, 124 (5th Cir. 1952). In Mater, the Fifth Circuit held that any law which exists in a
territory over which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction must derive its au-
thority from the federal government. The national source of authority transforms state law
into federal law for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 124; see Macomber v. Bose, 401 F.2d 545
(9th Cir. 1968). In Macomber the Ninth Circuit dealt with a riparian rights case arising on
land that had been ceded along with complete jurisdiction to the federal government. Ma-
comber held that state law served as federal law because federal authority was the only
authority in the area. Id. at 546.
The Pratt court also cited Fowler v. Dodson, 159 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Pa. 1958), as sup-
porting its decision. 585 F.2d at 697. The facts in Fowler closely resemble those in Pratt.
Fowler involved a claim arising from an automobile accident in the Shenandoah National
Park. The Fowler court held that, since Virginia had retained concurrent jurisdiction over
the Park land when ceding it to the United States, § 457 was inapplicable. Plaintiff's claim
was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 103-04. But see Quadrini v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 87 (D. Conn. 1977). (§ 457 provides a
basis for federal question jurisdiction because the cause of action derives from federal stat-
ute but the federal court must apply state law directly); see note 16 supra.
37 Section 457 itself does not specify whether its provisions are an adoption of state law
as federal law or an attempt to cede jurisdiction over wrongful death claims back to the
states. The Committee Report regards § 457 as an adoption of state law. CoMMITTEs RE-
PORT, supra note 6, at 152-53. The Committee Report shows that in a case of retrocession of
jurisdiction to a state, that state's consent is required. Id. Such retrocession statutes pro-
vide for application of state laws for workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation
and other matters, and cannot be implemented without some action by the state. See note
10 supra. In contrast, § 457 has no provision for state consent and therefore the Committee
Report classifies the application of the section as a federal adoption of state law rather than
a retrocession of jurisdiction. COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 153.
Plaintiffs generally desire to litigate their claims in federal court because of liberalized
discovery, procedural and evidentiary rules. Conversely, federal courts want to keep litigants
out of federal court because of overcrowded dockets. See WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 88. To
eliminate the problem of determining whether an area is under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, Congress could cede back to the state sufficient jurisdiction to handle all
civil and criminal cases. Plaintiffs then would realize, without wasting valuable court time,
that they cannot gain access to federal courts by federalizing state law. A retrocession of
jurisdiction obviously would ease overcrowded federal dockets. States, however, may not be
able to take jurisdiction over areas acquired by the federal government for military pur-
poses. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17; Sewell, supra note 8, at 311-12; note 6 supra.
" See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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B. The Seventh Amendment's Effect on Erie
Since Congress granted diversity jurisdiction to federal courts in the
First Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Act),1 federal courts have considered the
problem of determining whether state or federal law should be applied in
diversity cases. Section 34 of the Act, known as the Rules of Decision Act,
provides that the laws of the several states shall be regarded as rules of
decision in the federal courts.2 Courts have experienced difficulty in ap-
plying the Rules of Decision Act because of the ambiguous nature of the
word "laws." s In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,4 the Supreme Court held
that only state substantive law is binding on the federal courts in diver-
sity cases, and that federal courts should continue to follow federal proce-
dure.5 Erie's goal was to insure uniformity of decision between state and
federal courts.' Nevertheless, the abstract nature of Erie's substance ver-
sus procedure distinction made consistent application of that test diffi-
cult.7 Because of this difficulty, the Court discarded the substance versus
1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)). Section 1332 extends
federal court jurisdiction to controversies between citizens of different states and between a
state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). Section 1652 provides that the laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply.
The basic issue in interpreting § 1652, see note 2 supra, centers on the word "laws."
Specifically, the issue is whether state common law is included in the laws of the several
states which the federal courts are required to apply. One commentator has stated that
determining the meaning of § 1652 has been the most difficult issue in the whole field of
jurisprudence. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, § 54 at 249 (3d ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 72-73.
The Erie Court stated that uniformity of decision between state and federal courts
would serve two purposes. Id. at 75. First, litigants should be prevented from forum shop-
ping. Second, the Court indicated that their decision should serve to preserve state sover-
eignty in the federal system. Id. at 73. Whether Erie is based directly on the constitution
has been a matter of dispute. The Erie Court held that the unconstitutionality of allowing
federal courts to apply federal general common law required the decision. Id. at 77-78. The
Court added that, by applying federal law, the federal courts invade rights reserved by the
Constitution to the states. Id. at 80. Some commentators have argued that Erie's basis is in
the Rules of Decision Act itself because the Act gave power to the central government to
make only procedural rules. Therefore, the use of the Constitution as a source of limitation
on the federal government's power is unnecessary. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REv. 693, 704 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely]; see Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond:
A Bird's Eye View of Federalism In Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REv. 443, 443 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Smith]. See also Whicher, The Erie Doctrine And The Seventh
Amendment: A Suggested Resolution To Their Conflict, 37 TEx. L. REV. 549, 550-52 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Whicher].
Lower federal courts have generally avoided the constitutional implications of Erie. See
Smith, supra, at 446. The Supreme Court, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198,
202 (1955), indicated that Erie has constitutional dimension.
I The First Circuit, in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1940), showed that the Erie substance versus procedure distinction is of little aid
[Vol. XXXVII
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procedure test and adopted an outcome determinative test in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York,' holding that any state law which might affect the out-
come of a case is binding on the federal courts.9
The Court again clarified the Erie doctrine in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Ru-
ral Electric Cooperative.10 In Byrd, the Court was presented with a con-
flict between a state rule requiring trial court judges to decide a specific
factual issue and the federal practice allowing the jury to decide the fac-
tual question."' The Byrd Court used a balancing test to resolve the con-
flict, holding that countervailing federal considerations outweighed the
state interest involved."2 Although Byrd indicated a shift from Guaranty
in determining whether to apply state law. In determining whether a federal court should
apply state burden of proof rules, the Sampson decision stated that merely classifying the
issue as one of substance or procedure would have been an oversimplification. Id. at 754.
The First Circuit instead looked to the policy behind Erie to resolve the issue. Id. at 756.
Labeling a rule as substantive or procedural is the result of analysis, not the process of the
analysis itself. 43 MINN. L. REV. 580, 581 n.7 (1959).
a 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The Guaranty Trust Court held that the determining factor in a
choice between federal and state law is whether disregard of state law by the federal court
would significantly affect the result of a litigation. Id. at 109. See generally Miller, Federal
Rule 44.1 And The "Fact" Approach To Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell For A Die
Hard Doctrine, 65 MiCH. L. REV. 615 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
9 326 U.S. at 109. One commentator has noted that almost every procedural rule may
have a substantial effect on the outcome of a case. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 55 at 256; see
Miller, supra note 8, at 708. Carried to its logical extreme, the Guaranty Trust outcome
determinative test could mean the destruction of federal rules in diversity cases, most im-
portantly the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court later neutralized the
impact of Guaranty Trust in Hanna v. Plumber, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), by stating that the
purpose of Erie was not to "bottle up" federal courts with outcome determinative "stop-
pers." Id. at 475; see Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 769 (5th Cir.
1963). See also text accompanying notes 14-18 infra.
:0 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
1 356 U.S. at 533-34. Byrd involved a claim for personal injury damages against an
employer. The defendant argued that as an employee, plaintiff's only remedy was under the
state workman's compensation act. The trial judge struck this affirmative defense, and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 526. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that
under state law the employer had established his defense, and directed entry of judgment in
his favor. Blue Ridge Electric Coop. v. Byrd, 238 F.2d 346, 357 (4th Cir. 1956).
The Supreme Court considered whether the factual issue raised by the defense should
have been tried to a jury, or whether the state rule of allowing the judge to decide the stated
issue should prevail. 356 U.S. at 528. The Byrd court could have avoided the judge-jury
issue because the trial judge did not pass on the question and thus committed no error. In
addition, the Supreme Court's mandate directed that the -case first be sent to the court of
appeals because rulings on these issues might have made the judge-jury question moot.
Whicher, supra note 6, at 555; see Smith, supra note 6, at 447.
12 The Byrd court cited the independent nature of the federal system as a counter-
vailing federal consideration requiring application of the federal rule in the case. 356 U.S. at
537. One of the more confusing countervailing considerations utilized by the Byrd court was
the seventh amendment. The Court held, "An essential characteristic of [the federal] system
is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between
judge and jury and, under the influence-if not command-of the Seventh Amendment,
assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury." Id. (footnote omitted). As
several commentators have pointed out, this quasi-seventh amendment interest has caused a
great deal of uncertainty. A more reasonable approach for analyzing cases would be to apply
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Trust's outcome determinative test to a test favoring certain federal poli-
cies, the Byrd opinion did not completely abandon the outcome determi-
native test.1 3
The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area, Hanna v.
Plumer," again modified the outcome determinative test.1 5 Citing Erie's
underlying goals as discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the law,' the Hanna Court set forth a reju-
venated outcome determinative test.'1 The Court indicated that, in decid-
ing whether to apply state or federal law, state law is important only in
ascertaining whether the state rule would be unfairly discriminatory to a
litigant or would cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.28
the seventh amendment fully or not at all. See Redish and Phillips, Erie And The Rules Of
Decision Act: In Search Of The Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARv. L. REV. 356, 387 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Redish and Phillips); Whicher, supra note 6, at 557.
The Byrd Court employed a three step analysis in reaching its decision that the federal
rule applied. First, the Court concluded that the state rule was not bound up with state
created rights and obligations and therefore the federal court was not required to apply the
rule. 356 U.S. at 535. Second, while the outcome of the case may have been affected by who
decided the issue, affirmative countervailing considerations required that courts adhere to
the federal policy of jury trial. Id. at 539. Third, the likelihood of a different result was not
strong enough to require application of the state rule. Id. at 540.
" 356 U.S. at 539. The third part of the Byrd opinion indicated the continuing vitality
of the outcome determinative test by stating that the use of a jury might not change the
outcome of the litigation. Id. at 540. Byrd demonstrated an awareness that the federal rule
would likely produce a different result than the state rule, and the Court was hesitant to
abandon completely Guaranty Trust. Id. at 539.
14 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The issue in Hanna was whether FRCP 4(d)(1) or state law
governed service of process. Hanna held that the federal rule governed. Id. at 474. The
Hanna Court emphasized that the purpose of the federal rules is to insure uniformity in the
federal system. The Court noted that Erie, even as interpreted by Guaranty Trust, was not
intended to "bottle up" federal courts with outcome determinative and integral-relations
"stoppers." Id. at 473; see Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th
Cir. 1963). The Court indicated that constitutionally supported federal considerations must
prevail over state rules. Id. at 473.
" Although the Hanna decision ultimately turned on the superiority of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the decision indicated a shift in the Court's analysis of cases in-
volving Erie questions. The Court held that the outcome determinative test could not be
read without reference to Erie's aims of discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws. 380 U.S. at 468.
16 Id.
'7 The Hanna Court carefully distinguished previous cases where a state rule was held
applicable despite the apparent relevancy of a federal rule. The Court held that these cases
did not control in Hanna because the federal rule involved in each was not broad enough to
be applied. Therefore, Erie required the enforcement of state law. 380 U.S. at 470; see Co-
hen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).
18 380 U.S. at 468 n.9. Because the Hanna analysis is premised on the goals of avoiding
forum shopping and insuring equitable administration of the law, the opinion appears to be
inconsistent with Byrd. The Byrd Court looked primarily to the importance of competing
state and federal interests, wholly apart from forum shopping considerations. 356 U.S. at
537-38. Byrd indicated that the relevant inquiry was whether a state rule was bound up with
the parties' rights and obligations. Id. at 535; see note 12 supra. Hanna indicated that the
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Byrd and Hanna demonstrate that federal rules are basic to our fed-
eral system.19 When state and federal rules conflict, compelling federal
interests often require that state sovereignty be sacrificed.20 If the federal
rule is supported by constitutional considerations, as illustrated by the
seventh amendment in Byrd,2' the state rule should not prevail. The
Fourth Circuit has consistently applied Byrd in diversity cases without
recognizing Hanna's impact on the Byrd analysis. 22 The Fourth Circuit
recently reexamined the applicability of state or federal law in diversity
cases in Justice v. Pennzoil Co.2s
In Justice, the Fourth Circuit faced the issue whether federal or state
law applied in determining whether the judge or the jury should decide a
question of unreasonable and negligent use of land. The court held that
the federal district court was required to apply state law.2 4 In Justice, the
owner of surface rights in a parcel of land claimed that the Pennzoil Com-
pany, which held rights to the oil and gas underneath the land, had un-
reasonably and negligently damaged the surface during Pennzoil's drilling
of several oil wells.25 Plaintiffs brought suit in state court, defendant re-
moved, 26 and the issue of unreasonable use was submitted to the jury de-
spite the existence of contrary state law.27 The plaintiff obtained a verdict
importance of the state rule is relevant, but not in terms of how valuable the rule is to the
state. A state rule is important only in the context of determining whether application of
the rule would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum state or cause a plaintiff to
choose the federal court. 380 U.S. at 468 n.9.
I See note 14 supra.
2: See text accompanying note 12 supra.
21 See note 12 supra.
2 In decisions subsequent to Hanna, the Fourth Circuit has cited various federal con-
siderations in each case which allowed the court to dispense with the state rule. In Atkins v.
Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1970), the Fourth
Circuit recognized that the federal courts should function as a cohesive, relatively unitary
system for the administration of justice. Id. at 538. Atkins held that the federal rule applied
for determining the tolling effect of a pending identical suit in another federal court. Id. at
527-28.
In Wratchford v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969), the Fourth
Circuit was influenced by the seventh amendment as utilized in Byrd and the need to main-
tain an independent federal judicial system. Id. at 1064 & 1066. Wratchford held that the
federal standard applied for determining the sufficiency of evidence necessary to raise a jury
question. Id. at 1062.
Finally, in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), the Fourth
Circuit noted the federal interest in providing a convenient forum for the adjudication of
claims. Id. at 65. Szantay utilized a balancing test to hold that a state statute which would
ordinarily bar the suit would not operate in a federal court. Id. at 66; see text accompanying
notes 32-42 infra.
:3 598 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1979).
24 Id. at 1341.
5 d.
24 Id.
., Id. See Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950). In
Adkins, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that the court, not the jury, should decide
whether the use of the surface by an owner of minerals lying underneath the surface has
exceeded the fairly necessary use thereof. Id. at -, 61 S.E.2d at 636.
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of $10,000, and the defendant appealed.2 8
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the trial court and reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial.29 The court held that the district court
erred in submitting the issue of unreasonable use to the jury. 0 The Jus-
tice court employed a two part analysis to decide whether the state or
federal rule should have been applied. First, the Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that the state rule delegating the unreasonable use issue to the
judge was bound up with the rights and obligations of the parties, and the
federal court was therefore obligated to apply the state rule.", Second, the
court stated that the state rule allowing the judge to determine the unrea-
sonable use issue from the jury's findings of fact was compatible with
Byrd and therefore that state rule was binding on a federal court.3 2 In
distinguishing Byrd, which required use of the federal rule, the Justice
court made no reference to the seventh amendment."3
In an earlier Fourth Circuit case, Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
s
3
the Fourth Circuit set out a three part analysis for a federal court to em-
ploy in resolving federal-state rule conflicts.3 5 First, if the state provision
comprises the substantive right at issue, the state rule must be applied.
Second, if the state provision is intimately bound up with the right or
obligation being asserted, the state rule must be applied. Third, if the
The vast majority of decisions indicate that whether use of the surface by a mineral
owner is reasonable is a question of fact for the jury, provided that there is sufficient evi-
dence to raise the issue. See, e.g., Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 48 Cal. App. 2d 429, _
119 P.2d 973, 977 (1941); Schlegel v. Kinzie, 158 Okla. 93, -, 12 P.2d 223, 224 (1932); Getty
Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971). See also Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability
and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEx. L. REV. 1, 4 (1956).
28 598 F.2d at 1341.
29 Id. at 1345.
30 Id. at 1343.
31 Id. at 1342-43; cf. Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, -, 4 So. 350, 354 (1888) (state law
mandates jury should hear reasonable use issue). The Justice court applied the first level of
the Byrd analysis to determine whether the state rule was bound up with the parties' rights
and obligations. 598 F.2d at 1342-43; see note 12 supra.
The Justice court also indicated in the first part of its analysis that the nature of the
unreasonableness issue made it unsuitable for jury determination. The court cited Adkins v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 719, 61 S.E.2d 633 (1950), as support for the proposition
that unreasonable use of land by a mineral owner is not measured by the normal tort stan-
dard of a reasonable man. The court stated that the issue is measured by concrete legal
standards rooted in the common law. 598 F.2d at 1342. Although the Justice court cited
Adkins as support for the conclusion that legal standards would determine the unreasona-
bleness issue, Adkins failed to enumerate the applicable legal standards.
32 598 F.2d at 1343. The Justice court held that the jury should find the factual issues
relating to damages, perhaps on special interrogatories, and from those findings the judge
should then decide the issue of unreasonable use. Id. Relying on the state classification of
the issue as one of law enabled the Justice court to hold that the state's allocation of func-
tions between judge and jury was compatible with Byrd. See text accompanying notes 10-13
supra.
11 See notes 11 & 12 supra, & note 47 infra.
34 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); see note 22 supra.
35 349 F.2d at 63-64.
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state provision is not so bound up, but its application would substantially
affect the outcome of the litigation, the federal court must apply the state
rule unless there exist countervailing federal considerations.3 6 The second
step of the Szantay analysis compelled the Justice court's conclusion that
the state procedural rule must be applied because the Justice court held
that the state rule was bound up with the parties' rights and obligations.
3 7
Szantay, a representative treatment of Erie problems by the Fourth
Circuit, seems inconsistent with Byrd and Hanna. The Hanna decision
indicated a shift away from Byrd type balancing in the analysis of state
law versus federal law conflicts.3 s The Hanna court was motivated by the
goals of promoting fairness between litigants and avoiding the evils of
forum shopping.3 9 Significantly, the decision respected state rules as be-
ing important, but only in the context of achieving these two goals.40 The
Szantay interpretation of Byrd, therefore, was at least modified if not
abandoned by Hanna.4' By limiting the inquiry to a consideration of
whether the state rule is bound up with state rights and obligations, the
Szantay analysis, and therefore the first step of the Justice analysis, is
highly suspect.
42
Justice held that the state practice of trying issues of fact to the jury
and issues of law to the judge, with the unreasonable use issue classified
as an issue of law, is compatible with Byrd.43 Justice is consistent with
the principle that, in jury trials, issues of fact are sent to the jury and
issues of law are given to the judge." The more important issue, however,
is which law determines whether the stated issue is one of law or fact.'
5
3' Szantay held that the state rule involved in the case was not "bound up" and that
countervailing federal considerations necessitated application of the federal rule. The Szan-
tay court relied on the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction as well as the federal
interest in providing a convenient forum. 349 F.2d at 64.
37 Under Szantay, when a state rule is bound up with the parties' rights and obliga-
tions, the federal court is required to apply it. The Justice court did not address the other
two parts of the Szantay analysis. See also text accompanying note 36 supra.
38 See note 18 supra.
:9 380 U.S. at 468.
40 See note 18 supra.
41 The Szantay analysis revolved around whether or not the state rule is bound up with
the parties' rights and obligations. See note 36 supra. Szantay's deference to the state rule,
is therefore, inconsistent with Hanna. See note 14 supra. Hanna apparently abandoned
Byrd's balancing test as well as the concept that a state rule can prevail only when the rule
is bound up with the rights and obligations of the parties. See Miller, supra note 8, at 714.
"' See notes 18 & 37 supra.
43 598 F.2d at 1343.
" The Supreme Court has held that in a jury trial the power of direction and superin-
tendence is committed to the judge, and the ultimate determination of the issues of fact is
committed to the jury. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 382 (1912); see
ABC-Paramount Records, Inc. v. Topps Record Distr. Co., 374 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1967);
Taylor v. Cirino, 321 F.2d 279, 281 (6th Cir. 1963).
" The classification of the unreasonable use issue as a question of law or fact deter-
mines whether the issue is to be tried to the judge or the jury. See note 44 supra. The terms
question of law and question of fact are synonyms for a judge question and a jury question
respectively. Weiner, The Civil Jury and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867,
1867-68 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Weiner].
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Federal courts should make this determination according to federal, not
state law.4" If the unreasonable use issue is classified as an issue of fact,
the Byrd case, and more specifically the seventh amendment, indicate
that the Justice analysis is incomplete.47 In Byrd, the Court balanced
state and federal interests and determined that the federal rule allowing
the jury to decide the issue of fact prevailed' s Since the conflict was re-
solved by balancing state and federal considerations, the Byrd Court was
able to avoid the question of whether the seventh amendment required
that the jury resolve the issue.
4 9
In Justice, the Fourth Circuit held that the Byrd balancing test re-
quired application of the state rule of giving the unreasonable use issue to
the judge.Y' The next question the Justice court should have considered
was whether the seventh amendment required that the jury decide the
46 The state's classification of an issue as fact or law should not determine whether the
issue should be tried to a jury in federal court. The vast majority of jurisdictions classify the
unreasonable use of land issue as one of fact. See note 27 supra. Negligence is normally a
question of fact for the jury to decide. Weiner, supra note 45, at 1876-77.
In Burcham v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 209 F.2d 35, 40 (4th Cir. 1954), the Fourth Circuit, in
the context of a negligence claim arising from an automobile accident, held that whether a
question is for the judge or for the jury is a question of federal practice and a federal court
is bound by federal and not state decisions. The court held that substantive state law was
applicable to the case, but federal law determined whether a question is for the decision of
the judge or jury under the seventh amendment. Id. Applying federal law, the court held
that issues such as whether the litigants exercised due care clearly required a jury trial by
express provision of the seventh amendment. Id. at 38; see Gillespie v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
486 F.2d 281, 283 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973); Weiner, supra note 45, at 1889-90.
In Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976), the court held that
the issue of when discovery of an actionable claim occurred is a question of fact for the jury,
despite state law to the contrary. Id. at 573. In Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit considered whether the issue of unreasonable delay in
payment of royalties required resolution by a jury. The court stated that where federal rules
would entitle litigants to a jury determination of a particular issue, the federal court would
not yield to contrary state practice. The court therefore concluded that the issue of whether
defendant had acted reasonably was a jury question. Id. at 1125. The Nunez court relied on
Byrd and Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam). The question in Simler was
whether the stated issue should be classified as legal under federal law or equitable under
state law. The Simler Court held that the right to jury trial in the federal courts is to be
determined under federal law in diversity as well as other actions. Id. at 222. Simler com-
pels use of federal law to classify issues as law or fact. See Ely, supra note 6, at 709.
17 See Weiner, supra note 45, at 1889-90; note 45 supra. The seventh amendment
states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall
be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
" See note 12 supra.
, The Supreme Court generally does not decide constitutional questions unless such a
decision is absolutely necessary to resolve a case. Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295
(1905); see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
50 598 F.2d at 1342-43; see text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
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